Publications
Cox, Joseph M. "Keeping Out of Harm's Way? Constitutional Due Process and State Repression." Journal of Human Rights, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2020.1733500.
Abstract: The question concerning a state leader’s decision to employ repression against domestic audiences extends beyond a binary choice. Leaders act strategically in choosing among a variety of repressive methods through a cost-benefit analysis largely predicated on whether the state will be held responsible for its actions. The divergent costs of repression, particularly physical integrity repression, vary across two dimensions: whether a particular form of repression is custodial or non-custodial, and whether legal means exist to hold leaders accountable. Non-custodial repression, which occurs in contexts outside direct state detention, is harder to link to the state. Furthermore, a state can employ non-custodial repression while maintaining the façade of abiding by constitutional expectations, particularly promises of pre-trial, due process. I use propensity score matching to identify four separate samples in which states vary on the presence or absence of four types of constitutional provisions: pre-trial release, habeas corpus actions, speedy trials, and the right to counsel. The empirical results support the theoretical expectations that the existence of pre-trial, due process provisions in a state’s constitution will increase the likelihood of non-custodial repression (disappearances and extrajudicial killings) and decrease the probability of a state employing custodial repression (political imprisonments).
Cox, Joseph M. "Negotiating Justice: Ceasefires, Peace Agreements, and Post-Conflict Justice." Journal of Peace Research 57(3) (2020): 466-481.
Abstract: Post-conflict justice is an integral component in maintaining stability and building peace in the aftermath of civil conflict. Despite its instrumental function, scholars routinely find that policymakers’ choice of justice is shaped by the structural conditions of the post-conflict environment, with outright victories leading to retributive forms of justice and negotiated outcomes yielding restorative forms of justice. However, existing literature conflates ceasefires and peace agreements into a single phenomenon, thereby overlooking the independent effects of each outcome. Leveraging the dual sovereignty framework, this article argues the conflation of negotiated outcomes is problematic because peace agreements and ceasefires generate different post-conflict environments. Relative to ceasefires, peace agreements lead to a reduction in the degree of dual sovereignty because they resolve a conflict’s incompatibility, thereby encouraging efforts to move society beyond war through restorative forms of justice. Due to the persistent threat of recurrent war generated by high levels of dual sovereignty, policymakers following ceasefires will be inclined to pursue retributive forms of justice that may target political opponents or potential defectors to bolster organizational strength. Statistical analyses confirm the underlying expectation that ceasefires and peace agreements yield different post-conflict justice outcomes. Peace agreements, relative to ceasefires, are more likely to be followed by the implementation of amnesties and reparations, whereas ceasefires exhibit a greater probability of yielding purges in the post-conflict environment.
Cox, Joseph M. "Courts Caught in Conflict? Institutional Trust and Social Conflict." Revista Juris Poiesis 22(29) (2019): 28-54 [Invited Article].
Abstract: According to positivity theory, the public's exposure to the American judicial system and the judiciary's unique set of symbols and processes tends to lead individuals to confer on the institution legitimacy and trust through mechanisms often not available to other political actors. This paper focuses on whether this theory operates outside of the American context, arguing that the legitimacy conferred by domestic audiences upon domestic judiciaries will be less variable than the legitimacy reposed in other governing actors. However, moving to a comparative context implicates a number of potentially additional factors, including the influence of variation across regime-types, legal systems, and issue areas. Are courts inherently unique, as suggested by positivity theory, or does the resiliency of courts vary across different institutional contexts? In order to answer this question, this study leverages survey data from the Latinobarómetro and the Afrobarometer to measure levels of public trust in several governing institutions, including, but not limited to, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature, to analyze whether institutional legitimacy varies across different governmental actors in the presence of public opposition to government policy or across different legal institutional contexts. Public discontent with policy is measured using data coded by the Social Conflict Analysis Database, which identifies instances of demonstrations, riots, and strikes. As a measure of the institutional context within which a judiciary operates, the analyses leverage a latent variable of judicial independence created by Linzer and Staton (2015). The paper's statistical analyses provide evidence to support the distinctiveness of judiciaries, finding that social conflict can impact negatively public trust in executives and legislative institutions, yet exert no influence on public trust in judiciaries. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that high levels of judicial independence can be converted to higher levels of trust in the judiciary.
Cox, Joseph M. "Keeping Out of Harm's Way? Constitutional Due Process and State Repression." Journal of Human Rights, DOI: 10.1080/14754835.2020.1733500.
Abstract: The question concerning a state leader’s decision to employ repression against domestic audiences extends beyond a binary choice. Leaders act strategically in choosing among a variety of repressive methods through a cost-benefit analysis largely predicated on whether the state will be held responsible for its actions. The divergent costs of repression, particularly physical integrity repression, vary across two dimensions: whether a particular form of repression is custodial or non-custodial, and whether legal means exist to hold leaders accountable. Non-custodial repression, which occurs in contexts outside direct state detention, is harder to link to the state. Furthermore, a state can employ non-custodial repression while maintaining the façade of abiding by constitutional expectations, particularly promises of pre-trial, due process. I use propensity score matching to identify four separate samples in which states vary on the presence or absence of four types of constitutional provisions: pre-trial release, habeas corpus actions, speedy trials, and the right to counsel. The empirical results support the theoretical expectations that the existence of pre-trial, due process provisions in a state’s constitution will increase the likelihood of non-custodial repression (disappearances and extrajudicial killings) and decrease the probability of a state employing custodial repression (political imprisonments).
Cox, Joseph M. "Negotiating Justice: Ceasefires, Peace Agreements, and Post-Conflict Justice." Journal of Peace Research 57(3) (2020): 466-481.
Abstract: Post-conflict justice is an integral component in maintaining stability and building peace in the aftermath of civil conflict. Despite its instrumental function, scholars routinely find that policymakers’ choice of justice is shaped by the structural conditions of the post-conflict environment, with outright victories leading to retributive forms of justice and negotiated outcomes yielding restorative forms of justice. However, existing literature conflates ceasefires and peace agreements into a single phenomenon, thereby overlooking the independent effects of each outcome. Leveraging the dual sovereignty framework, this article argues the conflation of negotiated outcomes is problematic because peace agreements and ceasefires generate different post-conflict environments. Relative to ceasefires, peace agreements lead to a reduction in the degree of dual sovereignty because they resolve a conflict’s incompatibility, thereby encouraging efforts to move society beyond war through restorative forms of justice. Due to the persistent threat of recurrent war generated by high levels of dual sovereignty, policymakers following ceasefires will be inclined to pursue retributive forms of justice that may target political opponents or potential defectors to bolster organizational strength. Statistical analyses confirm the underlying expectation that ceasefires and peace agreements yield different post-conflict justice outcomes. Peace agreements, relative to ceasefires, are more likely to be followed by the implementation of amnesties and reparations, whereas ceasefires exhibit a greater probability of yielding purges in the post-conflict environment.
Cox, Joseph M. "Courts Caught in Conflict? Institutional Trust and Social Conflict." Revista Juris Poiesis 22(29) (2019): 28-54 [Invited Article].
Abstract: According to positivity theory, the public's exposure to the American judicial system and the judiciary's unique set of symbols and processes tends to lead individuals to confer on the institution legitimacy and trust through mechanisms often not available to other political actors. This paper focuses on whether this theory operates outside of the American context, arguing that the legitimacy conferred by domestic audiences upon domestic judiciaries will be less variable than the legitimacy reposed in other governing actors. However, moving to a comparative context implicates a number of potentially additional factors, including the influence of variation across regime-types, legal systems, and issue areas. Are courts inherently unique, as suggested by positivity theory, or does the resiliency of courts vary across different institutional contexts? In order to answer this question, this study leverages survey data from the Latinobarómetro and the Afrobarometer to measure levels of public trust in several governing institutions, including, but not limited to, the judiciary, the executive, and the legislature, to analyze whether institutional legitimacy varies across different governmental actors in the presence of public opposition to government policy or across different legal institutional contexts. Public discontent with policy is measured using data coded by the Social Conflict Analysis Database, which identifies instances of demonstrations, riots, and strikes. As a measure of the institutional context within which a judiciary operates, the analyses leverage a latent variable of judicial independence created by Linzer and Staton (2015). The paper's statistical analyses provide evidence to support the distinctiveness of judiciaries, finding that social conflict can impact negatively public trust in executives and legislative institutions, yet exert no influence on public trust in judiciaries. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that high levels of judicial independence can be converted to higher levels of trust in the judiciary.
Selected Manuscripts in Progress
Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, Joseph M. Cox, and Margaret Farry. "Tactics of Resistance and Post-Conflict Judicial Independence." (Invited to Revise and Resubmit)
Abstract: Cross-national evidence suggests that nonviolent resistance is more effective at promoting post-campaign democracy as compared to violent resistance. We are especially interested in the previously-understudied consequences of resistance for post-conflict judicial systems. Courts have been shown to be important for promoting and protecting economic development and political rights, yet have been almost largely ignored in quantitative studies of post-conflict democratization. We argue that judicial independence will be higher following nonviolent campaigns than following violent conflict, as the leader will be inclined to use independent courts as a mechanism to prevent future unrest—but will do so primarily when he anticipates a more significant mobilization threat and when he expects legal action to be an acceptable channel for dispute resolution by dissidents. Large-N analyses of global data on violent and nonviolent anti-government campaigns provide support for our expectations. We find that latent judicial independence is higher following nonviolent campaigns than violent ones, and that this distinction holds across the decade following campaign termination. Furthermore, a campaign’s outcome does not matter—post-conflict judicial independence appears to be associated with tactics, not success.
Cox, Joseph M., and Matthew R. Cobb. "Courts in the Midst of Conflict: Social Conflict and Legal Institutions." (Invited to Revise and Resubmit)
Abstract: As politics become judicialized, national courts play an increasingly significant role in political interactions among state actors and members of a polity. Social conflict is embodied by protests, riots, strikes, interactions between state actors and individuals, and conflict among community members and often stems from disputes over the distribution of political power, public goods, and state services. Many of these matters may also fall under the legal purview of a country’s judicial system. By offering a means of non-violent dispute resolution through litigation, courts can ameliorate social conflict. However, we argue that the institutional differences across civil, common, Islamic, and mixed law systems alter the costs associated with litigation, with civil law systems exhibiting the lowest levels of litigations costs. Therefore, members of civil law states should be more likely to leverage litigation to prevent or resolve conflict, leading to fewer instances of social conflict. However, central government actors will be reticent to empower courts to act as a check on their power and are therefore only likely to permit courts to fulfill this role in disputes involving communal disputes or claims against subnational political actors. Leveraging events data from the Social Conflict Analysis Database, our statistical analysis demonstrates that civil law states, relative to states with other legal systems, will experience fewer instances of social conflict, particularly as it relates to conflict directed against non-state actors and events targeting regional government actors.
Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, Joseph M. Cox, and Margaret Farry. "Tactics of Resistance and Post-Conflict Judicial Independence." (Invited to Revise and Resubmit)
Abstract: Cross-national evidence suggests that nonviolent resistance is more effective at promoting post-campaign democracy as compared to violent resistance. We are especially interested in the previously-understudied consequences of resistance for post-conflict judicial systems. Courts have been shown to be important for promoting and protecting economic development and political rights, yet have been almost largely ignored in quantitative studies of post-conflict democratization. We argue that judicial independence will be higher following nonviolent campaigns than following violent conflict, as the leader will be inclined to use independent courts as a mechanism to prevent future unrest—but will do so primarily when he anticipates a more significant mobilization threat and when he expects legal action to be an acceptable channel for dispute resolution by dissidents. Large-N analyses of global data on violent and nonviolent anti-government campaigns provide support for our expectations. We find that latent judicial independence is higher following nonviolent campaigns than violent ones, and that this distinction holds across the decade following campaign termination. Furthermore, a campaign’s outcome does not matter—post-conflict judicial independence appears to be associated with tactics, not success.
Cox, Joseph M., and Matthew R. Cobb. "Courts in the Midst of Conflict: Social Conflict and Legal Institutions." (Invited to Revise and Resubmit)
Abstract: As politics become judicialized, national courts play an increasingly significant role in political interactions among state actors and members of a polity. Social conflict is embodied by protests, riots, strikes, interactions between state actors and individuals, and conflict among community members and often stems from disputes over the distribution of political power, public goods, and state services. Many of these matters may also fall under the legal purview of a country’s judicial system. By offering a means of non-violent dispute resolution through litigation, courts can ameliorate social conflict. However, we argue that the institutional differences across civil, common, Islamic, and mixed law systems alter the costs associated with litigation, with civil law systems exhibiting the lowest levels of litigations costs. Therefore, members of civil law states should be more likely to leverage litigation to prevent or resolve conflict, leading to fewer instances of social conflict. However, central government actors will be reticent to empower courts to act as a check on their power and are therefore only likely to permit courts to fulfill this role in disputes involving communal disputes or claims against subnational political actors. Leveraging events data from the Social Conflict Analysis Database, our statistical analysis demonstrates that civil law states, relative to states with other legal systems, will experience fewer instances of social conflict, particularly as it relates to conflict directed against non-state actors and events targeting regional government actors.
